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any other device by which individual Americans become the unwilling
instruments of foreign policy.
67
KENNETH L. PENEGAR
Corporations-Constitutional Law-Retroactive Application of
Curative Statute Affecting Corporate Existence
The case of Lester Bros. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.' affirmed the
doctrine of Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co. 2 that a corporation
became dormant when the number of stockholders was reduced to less
than the statutory requirement of three. The court in the Lester case
held that the North Carolina legislature's curative act,3 passed in an
attempt to obviate the Park Terrace doctrine, was of no aid to the de-
fendant Pope because the statute could not operate retroactively to defeat
vested rights. In Park Terrace the result of dormancy was that the sole
stockholder became the real party in interest in a breach of contract suit
brought in the name of the corporation.4 In Lester one of two stock-
holders was made a defendant and was held individually liable for an
extension of credit which had ostensibly been made to the corporation
only.
The plaintiff in Lester had sought to hold defendant Pope individu-
ally liable for certain sales of package houses made to defendant corpora-
tion Pope Realty and Insurance Company. The corporation had been
formed with three stockholders. Between January 12 and June 20, 1955,
the plaintiff delivered three bills of merchandise to the Company which
during this time had only two stockholders. These bills were unpaid,
and this indebtedness comprised part of the claim for which suit was,
brought.5  At trial the Superior Court denied plaintiff's motion for
judgment against Pope individually.
On appeal the Supreme Court cited Park Terrace and stated that
when a corporation had less than three stockholders the stockholders
" There is nothing in the proposed statute which would preclude travel to
areas where the individual's safety might be in doubt. It should be government's
function to forewarn the traveler of the dangers and not to prevent him from
assuming the risk.
1250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959).
2243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E2d 584 (1956). For an extensive discussion of this case
see Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1959).
The decision caused much adverse comment. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle
and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956); Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. REV. 432, 441-44 (1956); Comment, 14 WAsH. & LEE L. Rrv. 72 (1957).
The plaintiff alleged fraud on the part of Pope and sought to hold him liable
on all other deliveries made to the corporation, as well as these three. The Supreme
Court upheld a finding that there was no reliance on his false statements and there-
fore no liability on the basis of fraud.
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could no longer function as a corporate entity but only as individuals.
Thus Pope was individually liable for the three bills of merchandise, and
the court ruled that plaintiff's motion for judgment should have been
granted.
In 1957, after the Park Terrace decision, G.S. § 55-3.1 was enacted
by the North Carolina legislature for the purpose of nullifying the ruling
that a corporation became dormant when the number of shareholders
dropped below three. In the principal case the court quoted subsection
(d) of this statute which reads:
If any corporation or purported corporation might have been
considered dormant or inactive solely in consequence of the ac-
quisition heretofore of all its, shares by one or two persons, such
corporation or purported corporation is hereby declared to have
bad uninterrupted capacity to act as a corporation.6
The court then stated:
The defendant Pope contends the foregoing statute' relieves
him from individual liability .... [W]hen plaintiff dealt with
Pope the law of this State as declared in the Park Terrace case
made him individually liable .... The plaintiff had a vested right
in that liability. The liability attached in 1955. The Legislature,
in 1957, could not take it away without violating the obligation of
the contract. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10; N.C.
Constitution, Article I, Section 17.8
Thus the plaintiff-creditor acquired a vested right against the stock-
holder Pope individually, even though there was no showing that at the
time the merchandise was delivered the plaintiff was aware that there
were less than three stockholders or that the plaintiff had any intention
of extending credit to anyone other than the corporation itself.
Although the court stated that this vested right could not be abridged
by retroactive legislation, this does not mean that G.S. § 55-3.1 was held
to be wholly void. The court may have intended to hold that only
subsection (d) was unconstitutional, severing this part from the rest
of the statute.9 Or the court may have intended to construe the statute
as constitutional in all cases except where vested rights would be affected,
so that only as applied in the latter case would the act be invalid.10 The
language of the decision is susceptible to either interpretation."1
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1(d) (Supp. 1959).
" It is difficult to tell if the court here referred to all of § 55-3.1 or only sub-
section (d). The dissent seems to support the view that the majority referred only
to subsection (d).
8 250 N.C. at 568, 109 S.E.2d at 266.
' A court may sever part of a statute even when the legislature does not ex-
pressly so provide. El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909).
10 An act may be invalid when applied in certain cases, but this will not cause
the downfall of the entire statute. Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474 (1913).
" The court also quoted with approval from a case which construed a statute
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There are other instances in which the North Carolina court has
interpreted retroactive legislation. A North Carolina statute'12 made
proof of registration in a party's name prima facie evidence of owner-
ship of a vehicle and prima facie evidence that the vehicle was being
operated in the course and scope of the owner's employment. The court
held18 that this statute would apply to causes of action which arose be-
fore its effective date of operation because the statute merely changed a
rule of evidence; the court stated that there is no vested right in a rule
of evidence. Another case14 held constitutional a 1929 statutory amend-
ment 15 as applied retroactively to a trust created in 1927. The court
held that this amendment, allowing revocation of a trust for unborn
beneficiaries, disturbed no vested rights. A subsequent trust case'0 held
valid a retroactive law' 7 which changed the method of removing and
substituting trustees; the court said no substantive rights were involved
and there was no impairment of the obligation Qf contract. The court
has also upheld' s the constitutionality of a statute' 9 which validated a
previous township election and an issue of bonds. Other cases have not
dealt so favorably with retroactive legislative acts. In a dictum the court
has stated20 that a creditor could not be deprived of rights which had
vested under a former statute2 ' imposing double liability on holders of
bank stock, and thus an amendment 22 terminating double liability would
not be allowed to affect such a creditor. Conversely, another dictum
declared 23 that a shareholder could not be assessed under a 1925 statute24
for stock purchased in 1919, since to have held the stockholder liable
would have destroyed the obligation of a contract, impaired vested rights
and denied due process. Where the legislature passed an act25 to vali-
date void deeds of gift by extending the time for registration, the court
as being only operative prospectively. Statutes will be so construed where possible.
However, the language of § 55-3.1 would make it virtually impossible for the court
to hold that the act was not intended to be retroactive.
"N.C. GE. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).
"Spencer v. McDowell Motor Co., 236 N.C. 239, 72 S.E.2d 598 (1952). The
statute excepted pending litigation from its effect.
" Stanback v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1950).
16 Bateman v. Sterrett, 201 N.C. 59, 159 S.E. 14 (1931).
'* N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 78 (now G.S. §§ 45-10, -12, -17 (1950)).
"Burney v. Commissioners of Bladen County, 184 N.C. 274, 114 S.E. 298
(1922).
"9 N.C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1921, ch. 32.
."o Hood ex el. United Bank & Trust Co. v. Richardson Realty, Inc., 211 N.C.
582, 590, 191 S.E. 410, 415 (1937) (dictum).
21 N.C. Pub. Laws 1921, ch. 4, § 21 ; N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 121, § 1.
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1935, ch. 99.
" Bank of Pinehurst v. Derby, 218 N.C. 653, 657-58, 12 S.E.2d 260, 263(1940) (dictum). The court avoided the constitutional question by construing the
statute as operative only prospectively.
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 117.
"N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, ch. 20.
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said, in refusing relief under the statute, that "the validating statute, if
constitutional, cannot be invoked to impair the vested right. 26  The
court has also stated2 7 that a statute2 s would not be construed as giving
authority to retroactive provisions of a corporate charter amendment
where such a construction would interfere with vested rights in pre-
ferred stock dividends.
The construction of curative legislation affecting corporations has
been dealt with by other jurisdictions. An Iowa case held consti-
tutional a curative act3" which validated a corporation previously de-
fective due to improper publication. The court here stated that the
statute interfered with no contractual libality. The Tennessee court3 '
sustained a statute32 which validated corporate charters previously de-
fective due to faulty acknowledgment. In this case the court held that
there were no vested rights in a defective charter. The United States
Supreme Court, however, held33 that the California legislature could
not take away the individual liability of a director of a corporation, the
liability having vested under a former constitutional provision.3 4 The
repeal of this constitutional provision did not help the defendant because
the obligation was contractual, and the right to enforce it had already
vested in the plaintiff. An Oregon case35 construed as operating
prospectively a constitutional amendment"6 which imposed double li-
ability on holders of bank stock; this construction kept the amendment
from being unconstitutional.
The North Carolina curative statute, G.S. § 55-3.1, took effect on
July 1, 1957. It is clear under the statutory construction in the prin-
cipal case that this act could sustain all corporations formed on or after
the effective date of the statute. Under this decision, however, the statute
will be able to sustain corporations in existence before this date only
in so far as no vested rights are involved in the corporate transactions.
This has left many problems for the one- and two-man corporations re-
garding transactions during the time before July 1, 1957. Would the
grantee in a deed executed by the dormant corporation be liable on
a dower claim if the sole shareholder, or either of the two shareholders,
2" Booth v. Hairston, 193 N.C. 278, 283, 136 S.E. 879, 881 (1927).
" Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
. N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 2, §§ 29, 30, 37, as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1925,
ch. 118, §§ 1, 2(a), as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 2, § 19, as amended;
N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 118, §§ 2, 2a, as amended.
Adler v. Baker-Dodge Theatre Co., 190 Iowa 970, 181 N.W. 254 (1921).
20 Iowa Acts and Joint Resolutions 1915, ch. 127.
Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 28 S.W. 668 (1894).
"
2Tenn. Acts 1890, ch. 17.
'
8 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
'CAL. CoNs'r. art. XII, § 3 (1879).
02 Schramm v. Done, 135 Ore. 16, 293 Pac. 931 (1930).
20 ORE. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1912).
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died before this date ?m Would there be personal income tax problems
raised for the one or two shareholders ?s In all corporate litigation
where the cause of action arose before July 1, 1957, would the one or
two stockholders be the real party or parties in interest ?39 Did the
corporate status come and go before July 1, 1957, depending on whether
at any given time there were at least three shareholders or less than that
number?4° Unfortunately the answers to these and other questions will
have to be determined on a case by case basis.
JoHN G. SHAW
Criminal Law-Inciting To Riot
In State v. Cole- the Ku Klux Klan burned two crosses in the county
and publicized a meeting to be held later in the week, the purpose of
which was to intimidate the Indian population of the county. Before
the day of the meeting the sheriff was apprised of tension growing among
the Indians of the county. He went to defendant Cole, who claimed to
be the Grand Wizard of the Klan, and told him that it would be danger-
ous to hold the meeting, but the meeting was not cancelled. As mem-
bers of the Klan began appearing with firearms at the appointed place
for the meeting, Indians of the county appeared with firearms and shoot-
ing began. Several hundred shots were fired before law enforcement
officers coiad restore order. There was no further attempt to convene
the meeting. The defendants Cole and Martin (and others to the
State unknown) were indicted for inciting to riot, in that they willfully
and unlawfully, while armed with firearms, assembled with the intent
to preach racial dissension and coerce and intimidate the populace, and
with the common intent to carry out such purpose in a violent manner
to the terror of the people and to assist each other against all who should
oppose them. The defendants were convicted, and the Supreme Court
upheld defendant Cole's conviction of inciting to riot (defendant
Martin's conviction was reversed on other grounds). In so doing the
court recognized that inciting to riot and riot are separate and distinct
offenses and said:
[I]nciting to riot is a common law offense, the gist of which is
its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace, though the parties
" This question was raised in Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 48, 50 (1957).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- ot
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 471, 479 (1956).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 471, 479 (1956).
o This question was raised in 250 N.C. at 570, 109 S.E.2d at 267 (dissent).
Judge Bobbitt also dissented in the Park Terrace case on its original hearing. If
his point of view had been adopted, several problems in North Carolina corpora-
tion law might have been avoided.
1249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
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